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"CIGA-2013"
Psychological Warfare

Minutes of SWNCC ad hoc Committee on Psychological Warfare

Thursday, Oct. 3, 1946

Present:

Mr. W.T. Stone, OIC, Chairman
Capt. H.R. Thurber, USN
Col. Dana W. Johnson, WD
[redacted] CIG
W.R. Tyler, OIC

1. Mr. Stone opened the meeting with a statement of the agenda and a review of the two principal recommendations of the sub-committee: (a) the necessity of avoiding the confusion which existed in the last war due to lack of political direction in the conduct of psychological warfare (Mr. Stone emphasized the importance from the point of view of the State Department of developing as clear and as sharply defined political direction in psychological warfare as possible, and that this direction, stemming from the Department of State, ought to be reflected in the central psychological warfare committee); and (b) the necessity of avoiding delay in expediting the directives for required approval and out to the field.

2. Mr. Stone queried whether the organization SWNCC in war time would be the same agency as in peace time, and asked what the present expectation was in this respect.

It was stated that SWNCC was set up as a war time agency, and it is believed that SWNCC will continue until something else is created in its stead. If there should be a merger of the armed forces, SWNCC would be superseded by something like a Council of Common Defense which would have a central intelligence agency. It was agreed that there was no need to worry about the continuation of SWNCC -- a parallel organization would be created in any event. This parallel organization might possibly include a National Resources Foundation.

3. It was recommended that the word "joint" be left out of the ad hoc committee's reference to the SWNCC/NIA committee. [redacted] suggested that the committee be referred to as the SWNCC/NIA Control (or Planning) Committee.

4. The problem of referring military matters to JCS was brought up by Capt. Thurber. He raised the question of whether psychological warfare should be left with JCS or with SWNCC/NIA.

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Mr. Stone asked whether, in order to avoid delay, it would be possible to have JCS brought into the central psychological warfare committee. It was, however, felt that they should remain separate.

Mr. Tyler asked how, practically speaking, the channelling of directives would be accomplished. Col. Johnston expressed his views to the effect that the SWNCC/NIA committee would be the central policy planning committee. For instance: the President and the State Department will set forth the foreign policy of the nation (which will, in fact, determine the policy in broad terms of what the psychological warfare policy is going to be). The functioning of the central psychological warfare committee, then, would be the issuing of such plans and policies (directives) as will support the dictated foreign policy. From the central committee the broad outline of the directives would go to "black" and "white" sub-committees for implementing directives which go out to the field.

Mr. Tyler asked when JCS concurrence would be obtained: (a) after the formulation of the policy directive by the central committee, or (b) after the "white" and "black" implementation.

The suggested procedure was that the policy directive as issued by the central control and policy committee would then be checked by JCS and returned to this committee for distribution to "black" and "white" for implementation. From "black" and "white", it would then be sent to JSP (Joint Staff Planners) for distribution to theater commanders.

The committee discussed the need for speed in the machinery. The committee felt that the remedy for the delay in the last war in getting the directives out to the field, lies in the creation of the proposed central planning committee. It was also felt that the ad hoc committee should point out these field objectives in their recommendations.

Mr. Tyler asked whether the weekly directives as drafted by the sub-committees of the Central Psychological Warfare Committee would also have to go through JCS. Col. Johnston stated that in his opinion, all that was necessary was to have the broad policy cleared with JCS. The weekly directives would merely be checked by hand with JSC (Joint Security Control), and then sent out through JCS Secretariat channel.

Mr. Stone suggested that a representative of JCS sit on the central psychological warfare committee.

It was then suggested that the committee be called the "Central Psychological Warfare Committee" (CPWC).

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5. Consideration was given by the ad hoc committee to the notes on the terms "Political and Psychological Warfare".

a. Capt. Thurber referred to SWNCC 304, and pointed out that the definitions should be set up from the point of view of war time conditions first since SWNCC 304 takes this form, and since ~~the term~~ "political warfare" is a difficult term to justify in peace time. From war time the committee could then work back to peace time conditions.

Mr. Stone stated that political warfare is the expression of national policy and is a part of psychological warfare.

Capt. Thurber felt that psychological warfare should be defined first and then related to political warfare.

Mr. Stone concluded that since political warfare is clearly within the setting of war time organization, a section of the report setting forth a statement of the purposes of this committee should deal with political warfare.

b. Capt. Thurber questioned the reference in the Definitions of the State Department sub-committee to the element of "deception" in psychological warfare.

It was agreed that the following quote should be substituted: "adding other elements including combat propaganda, subversion and black operations."

c. Capt Thurber suggested the following two changes:

paragraph 2: "all four foregoing instruments".

paragraph 3: "keenly aware of the capabilities and limitations".

d. Mr. Stone felt that paragraphs 1 through 3 of the "Notes on the terms, Political and Psychological Warfare" covered the definition aspect, and that the rest could be included in a report of the structure of a peace-time organization.

e. It was agreed that, after describing the charter of the ad hoc committee, there should be a definition of "psychological warfare" as it relates to over-all national political policy. All the definitions should be cast in terms of war time conditions first, setting forth the agreed definitions of "psychological warfare" in its relation to national policy.

6. There followed a discussion of Col. Johnson's^t analysis and recommendations regarding theater organization.

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Col. Johnston stated that at theater commander level, there should be a homogeneous organization. With the assumption that this is a purely military organization (civilians in uniform, etc.), there should be a political and psychological warfare policy advisor to the theater commander. This advisor would have an advisory function as far as psychological warfare operations were concerned, with view to deciding whether these operations were conducted in conformity with the foreign policy of the United States. The whole theater organization, of course, comes directly under the control of the Chief of Staff.

A title for this advisor was suggested by Capt. Thurber: "State Department Advisor", attached to the theater commander. In addition to being the political and psychological warfare policy advisor, he might also be competent to advise in the economic field. If not, another advisor might be added in an economic capacity.

Another title suggested for the advisor was "State Department Advisor for Psychological Warfare".

7. The various sub-divisions of Col. Johnston's theater organization were discussed in detail. It was agreed that Col. Johnston should undertake a description to accompany his chart, and an outline of the general requirements of the theater command organization.

8. There followed a discussion of the war time channelling of directives chart.

It was agreed that Col. Johnston should submit a paragraph on the incorporation of civilians, 4-F's etc. and the general training program which would be necessary.

Col. Johnston suggested that army and navy officers should participate in OIC operations with view to acquiring experience valuable for helping to train army and navy personnel in the information and propaganda field. Col. Johnston expressed his views on the possibility of having all officers of Psychological Warfare transfer to the Military Intelligence Reserve and classified as Psychological Warfare Reservists.

It was agreed that Mr. Tyler should prepare a description and an analysis of the functions of the channelling of directives chart in war time.

9. The next meeting of the ad hoc committee will take place Thursday October 10th, at 2:30 p.m., in Mr. Stone's office.

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